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ToolsDe Donder, Philippe, Llavador, Humberto, Penczynski, Stefan P., Roemer, John E. and Vélez-Grajales, Roberto (2025) Nash versus Kant: A game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior. Journal of Economics, 145. 97–128. ISSN 0931-8658
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Abstract
The vaccination game exhibits positive externalities. The standard game-theoretic approach assumes that parents make decisions according to the Nash protocol, which is individualistic and non-cooperative. However, in more solidaristic societies, parents may behave cooperatively, optimizing according to the Kantian protocol, in which the equilibrium is efficient. We develop a random utility model of vaccination behavior and prove that the equilibrium coverage rate is larger with the Kant protocol than with the Nash one. Using survey data collected from six countries, we calibrate the parameters of the vaccination game, compute both Nash equilibrium and Kantian equilibrium profiles, and compare them with observed vaccination behavior. We find evidence that parents demonstrate cooperative behavior in all six countries. The study highlights the importance of cooperation in shaping vaccination behavior and underscores the need to consider these factors in public health interventions.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Additional Information: | Funding information: Philippe De Donder acknowledges the French ANR under grant ANR-17-EURE-0010 (EUR CHESS) for financial support. Humberto Llavador acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S) and the grants PID2023-153318NB-I00 and PID2022-138443NB-I00. John Roemer acknowledges the Institute for Social and Policy Studies at Yale University for financial support. Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | free-rider problem,kantian equilibrium,measles vaccination,nash equilibrium,economics and econometrics,business, management and accounting(all),sdg 3 - good health and well-being ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002 |
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences |
| Related URLs: | |
| Depositing User: | LivePure Connector |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Feb 2025 18:30 |
| Last Modified: | 05 Jun 2025 11:30 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/98494 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00712-025-00898-x |
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