Voluntary interaction and the principle of mutual benefit

Isoni, Andrea, Sugden, Robert and Zheng, Jiwei (2023) Voluntary interaction and the principle of mutual benefit. Journal of Political Economy, 131 (6). pp. 1576-1616. ISSN 0022-3808

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Abstract

Most social preference theories are based on observations of non-voluntary interactions. Non-selfish behaviour may take fundamentally different forms in voluntary interactions, such as market transactions. We investigate the Principle of Mutual Benefit – an injunctive norm requiring individuals who enter interactions voluntarily to conform to common expectations about behaviour within them. This norm induces patterns of behaviour inconsistent with existing social preference theories, and allows extrinsic incentives to crowd in trustworthiness. We embed this norm in a model consistent with evidence about promise-keeping, gift exchange, and ‘avoiding the ask’. We present new experimental evidence that people adhere to it.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	Funding information: This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, grant agreement No. 670103.
Uncontrolled Keywords:	voluntary interaction,principle of mutual benefit,social norm,crowding in,non-selfish behaviour,economics, econometrics and finance(all) ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory
Related URLs:	http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?...
Depositing User:	LivePure Connector
Date Deposited:	11 Aug 2022 10:30
Last Modified:	16 Nov 2023 01:38
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/87177
DOI:	10.1086/722930

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