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Chakrabarti, Subhadip, Gilles, Robert P. and Lazarova, Emiliya 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7178-0644
(2021)
Stability of cartels in Multimarket Cournot oligopolies.
The Manchester School, 89 (1).
pp. 70-85.
ISSN 1463-6786
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Abstract
We investigate the stability of cooperation agreements, such as those agreed by cartels, among firms in a Cournot model of oligopolistic competition embedded in a multimarket contact setting. Our analysis considers a broad array of 64 potential market structural configurations under linear demand and quadratic production costs. We establish that for an appropriate range of parameter values there exists a unique core stable market configuration in which an identical two-firm cartel is sustained in both markets. Our result highlights the significance of multimarket presence for cartel formation in light of the well-known result from the single-market setting where cartels are non-profitable.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | cournot competition,merger paradox,multimarket oligopolies,economics and econometrics ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002 |
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Applied Econometrics And Finance |
| Related URLs: | |
| Depositing User: | LivePure Connector |
| Date Deposited: | 02 Sep 2020 23:53 |
| Last Modified: | 22 Oct 2022 06:44 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/76728 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/manc.12349 |
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