Balanced externalities and the Shapley value

McQuillin, Ben and Sugden, Robert ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3401-3139 (2018) Balanced externalities and the Shapley value. Games and Economic Behavior, 108. pp. 81-92. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We characterize the Shapley value using (together with standard conditions of efficiency and equal gains in two-player games) a condition of ‘undominated merge-externalities’. Similar to the well-known ‘balanced contributions’ characterization, our characterization corresponds intuitively to ‘threat points’ present in bargaining. It derives from the observation that all semivalues satisfy ‘balanced merge-externalities’. Our characterization is applicable to useful, narrow sub-classes of games (including monotonic simple games), and also extends naturally to encompass games in partition function form.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	shapley value,balanced contributions,merge-externalities,semivalues,coalitional bargaining
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	28 Mar 2018 12:30
Last Modified:	18 Jun 2026 17:47
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66630
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.006

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