McQuillin, Ben and Sugden, Robert (2018) Balanced externalities and the Shapley value. Games and Economic Behavior, 108. pp. 81-92. ISSN 0899-8256
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Abstract
We characterize the Shapley value using (together with standard conditions of efficiency and equal gains in two-player games) a condition of ‘undominated merge-externalities’. Similar to the well-known ‘balanced contributions’ characterization, our characterization corresponds intuitively to ‘threat points’ present in bargaining. It derives from the observation that all semivalues satisfy ‘balanced merge-externalities’. Our characterization is applicable to useful, narrow sub-classes of games (including monotonic simple games), and also extends naturally to encompass games in partition function form.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | shapley value,balanced contributions,merge-externalities,semivalues,coalitional bargaining |
Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics |
Depositing User: | Pure Connector |
Date Deposited: | 28 Mar 2018 12:30 |
Last Modified: | 20 Apr 2023 23:43 |
URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66630 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.006 |
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