“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

Chowdhury, Subhasish M. and Kim, Sang-Hyun (2017) “Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests. Games and Economic Behavior, 104. 486–493. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: contest design,multiple winner,group-size,selection mechanism
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 08 Jun 2017 05:08
Last Modified: 13 Oct 2019 00:22
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/63705
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012

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