“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

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Chowdhury, Subhasish M. and Kim, Sang-Hyun (2017) “Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests. Games and Economic Behavior, 104. 486–493. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	contest design,multiple winner,group-size,selection mechanism
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Related URLs:	http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/art...
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	08 Jun 2017 05:08
Last Modified:	22 Oct 2022 02:44
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/63705
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012

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