Tools
Tools
Eichner, Thomas and Kollenbach, Gilbert 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1168-3316
(2023)
Participation and duration of environmental agreements: Investment lags matter.
Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 10 (1).
pp. 33-53.
ISSN 2333-5955
Preview |
PDF (IEA_Timelag_Rev6)
- Accepted Version
Download (343kB) | Preview |
Abstract
This paper analyzes participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in which countries pollute and invest in two types of clean technology that differ in investment lags. If investments are noncontractible, countries underinvest in the long-lag technology in the last period of the contract, which leads to a hold-up problem. Countries do not underinvest in the short-lag technology. If the short-lag technology is sufficiently cheap, the hold-up problem becomes irrelevant, and significant participation is not feasible. Our paper supplements Battaglini and Harstad, who point out that the hold-up problem may result in significant participation and even in the first-best outcome, and shows that the assumptions required for significant participation may be more limited than expected.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | Publisher Copyright: © 2022 The Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. All rights reserved. |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | environmental agreements,investment lag,stable coalition,timing,economics and econometrics,nature and landscape conservation,management, monitoring, policy and law ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002 |
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict |
| Related URLs: | |
| Depositing User: | LivePure Connector |
| Date Deposited: | 07 Nov 2024 18:30 |
| Last Modified: | 10 Nov 2024 07:30 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/97578 |
| DOI: | 10.1086/721095 |
Downloads
Downloads per month over past year
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |