International Environmental Agreements and Black Technology

Kollenbach, Gilbert ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1168-3316 (2022) International Environmental Agreements and Black Technology. Environmental and Resource Economics, 82 (3). pp. 601-624. ISSN 0924-6460

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the stability of international environmental agreements in a dynamic game when the generation of both renewables and fossil fuel based energy requires specialized capital stocks or technologies, respectively. Two contract types are considered. At an incomplete (a complete) contract, the coalition coordinates only (both) CO2 emissions (and renewable energy investments) of its members. In contrast to the results of Battaglini and Harstad (J Polit Econ 124:160–204, 2016) who endorse incomplete contracts to increase the coalition size, only small coalitions are stable regardless of whether the contract is complete or incomplete. This result also holds if black technology is temporary not completely used or transfers are considered.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	Funding information: Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
Uncontrolled Keywords:	black capacity,complete contract,incomplete contract,international environmental agreements,economics and econometrics,management, monitoring, policy and law,sdg 7 - affordable and clean energy ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict
Related URLs:	http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?...
Depositing User:	LivePure Connector
Date Deposited:	21 Oct 2024 14:30
Last Modified:	31 Oct 2024 10:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/97078
DOI:	10.1007/s10640-022-00668-z

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