Coordination in stag hunt games

Silva, Rui (2024) Coordination in stag hunt games. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 113. ISSN 2214-8043

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Abstract

Stag hunt games display a tension between a payoff superior option (stag) and a less risky but payoff inferior alternative (hare). We explore that tension by proposing a selection criterion (which we denote as relative salience) where subjects choose to coordinate in one option by comparing the salience of stag’s main aspect (its payoff) to the salience of hare’s main aspect (its risk) by accounting for both payoff-relevant factors and unobservable individual-specific (idiosyncratic) preferences. Using data from 10 experiments, we find that this criterion is a significant determinant of individual choices in stag-hunt games, outperforming other selection methods.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	Data availability statement: The authors do not have permission to share data.
Uncontrolled Keywords:	equilibrium selection,coordination,relative salience,stag hunt game,risk dominance,payoff dominance
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Applied Econometrics And Finance Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory
Depositing User:	LivePure Connector
Date Deposited:	12 Sep 2024 12:30
Last Modified:	05 Nov 2024 00:51
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/96737
DOI:	10.1016/j.socec.2024.102290

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