Close-knit neighborhoods: Stability of cooperation in networks

Polanski, Arnold ORCID: (2024) Close-knit neighborhoods: Stability of cooperation in networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 215. ISSN 0022-0531

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Agents connected in a network face a binary choice whether to contribute or to free-ride. The former action is costly but benefits the agent and her neighbors, while the latter is free, but does not provide any benefits. Who will contribute if agents are farsighted and not constrained by a fixed non-cooperative protocol? I adapt the concepts of consistent sets and farsightedly stable sets to answer this question. When benefits to an agent are linear in the number of her contributing neighbors, the decision to contribute depends on the cohesion of her neighborhood as captured by the graph-theoretical concept of k-cores.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: public goods,networks,consistent sets,farsightedly stable sets
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Applied Econometrics And Finance
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory
Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 22 Dec 2023 02:21
Last Modified: 03 Jan 2024 03:18
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105775

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