Membership, governance, and lobbying in standard-setting organizations

Fiedler, Clemens, Larrain, Maria and Prufer, Jens ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7203-9711 (2023) Membership, governance, and lobbying in standard-setting organizations. Research Policy, 52 (6). ISSN 0048-7333

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Abstract

Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) are collectively self-governed industry associations, formed by innovators and implementers. They are a key organizational form to agree on and manage technical standards, and form the foundation for many technological and economic sectors. We develop a model of endogeneous SSO participation that highlights different incentives for joining (namely licensing, learning, and implementation). We analyze equilibrium selection and conduct comparative statics for a policy parameter that is related to implementer-friendly Intellectual Property Rights policies, or alternatively, minimum viable implementation. The results can reconcile existing evidence, including that many SSO member firms are small. The extent of statutory participation of implementers in SSO control has an inverted U-shape effect on industry profits and welfare.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Industrial Economics
Depositing User:	LivePure Connector
Date Deposited:	20 Mar 2023 09:40
Last Modified:	21 Oct 2023 00:43
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/91568
DOI:	10.1016/j.respol.2023.104761

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