And the first runner-up is...: Comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests

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Chowdhury, Subhasish M., Mukherjee, Anwesha and Turocy, Theodore L. (2025) And the first runner-up is...: Comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests. Review of Economic Design, 29 (3). pp. 447-477. ISSN 1434-4750

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Abstract

We characterise the strategic equivalence among k-winner contests using simultaneous and sequential winner selection. We test this prediction of strategic equivalence using a series of laboratory experiments, contrasting 1-winner contests with 2-winner contests, varying in the latter whether the outcome is revealed sequentially or in a single stage. We find that in the long run, average bidding levels are similar across strategically-equivalent contests. However, adaptation in 2-winner contests is slower and less systematic, which is consistent with the property that simultaneous winner selection results in outcomes that are more random than in the 1-winner case.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Funding: Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
Uncontrolled Keywords: experiment,learning,lottery contest,multi-winner contests,strategic equivalence,economics, econometrics and finance(all) ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences
Related URLs:
Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 19 Oct 2022 12:30
Last Modified: 25 Oct 2025 22:31
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/89206
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00315-5

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