And the first runner-up is...: Comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests

Chowdhury, Subhasish M., Mukherjee, Anwesha and Turocy, Theodore L. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2265-844X (2022) And the first runner-up is...: Comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests. Review of Economic Design. ISSN 1434-4750

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Abstract

We characterise the strategic equivalence among k-winner contests using simultaneous and sequential winner selection. We test this prediction of strategic equivalence using a series of laboratory experiments, contrasting 1-winner contests with 2-winner contests, varying in the latter whether the outcome is revealed sequentially or in a single stage. We find that in the long run, average bidding levels are similar across strategically-equivalent contests. However, adaptation in 2-winner contests is slower and less systematic, which is consistent with the property that simultaneous winner selection results in outcomes that are more random than in the 1-winner case.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	Funding: Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences
Depositing User:	LivePure Connector
Date Deposited:	19 Oct 2022 12:30
Last Modified:	22 Apr 2023 02:27
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/89206
DOI:	10.1007/s10058-022-00315-5

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