The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders

Polanski, Arnold ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9146-6364 and Le Quement, Mark (2022) The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders. International Journal of Game Theory. ISSN 0020-7276

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Abstract

Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause audiences to switch to the competitor. We fully characterize a focal Markov perfect equilibrium of this game and discuss the impact of exogenous parameters on the truthfulness of equilibrium reporting. In particular, we find that senders’ lying propensities are strategic complements so that increasing one sender’s bias decreases both senders’ truthfulness. We also analyse the role of polarization across senders.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: economics, econometrics and finance(all) ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 27 Sep 2022 10:30
Last Modified: 29 Jan 2023 06:30
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/88662
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00826-z

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