An auction market for journal articles

Prüfer, Jens ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7203-9711 and Zetland, David (2010) An auction market for journal articles. Public Choice, 145 (3). pp. 379-403. ISSN 0048-5829

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Abstract

We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting academic papers and show a strict Pareto-improvement in equilibrium. Besides the benefit of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. The "academic dollar" proceeds from papers sold at auction go to authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This nonpecuniary income indicates the academic impact of an article-facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion. This auction market does not require more work of editors.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: a11,academic journals,academic productivity,d02,d44,market design,sociology and political science,economics and econometrics ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3300/3312
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
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Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 08 Sep 2022 12:30
Last Modified: 30 Sep 2022 02:26
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/87959
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9571-3

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