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Prüfer, Jens 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7203-9711 and Zetland, David
(2010)
An auction market for journal articles.
Public Choice, 145 (3).
pp. 379-403.
ISSN 0048-5829
Abstract
We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting academic papers and show a strict Pareto-improvement in equilibrium. Besides the benefit of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. The "academic dollar" proceeds from papers sold at auction go to authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This nonpecuniary income indicates the academic impact of an article-facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion. This auction market does not require more work of editors.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | a11,academic journals,academic productivity,d02,d44,market design,sociology and political science,economics and econometrics ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3300/3312 |
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Industrial Economics |
| Related URLs: | |
| Depositing User: | LivePure Connector |
| Date Deposited: | 08 Sep 2022 12:30 |
| Last Modified: | 21 Oct 2023 00:42 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/87959 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11127-009-9571-3 |
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