Reputation and cooperation in defense

Hugh-Jones, David ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8360-8884 and Zultan, Ro'i (2013) Reputation and cooperation in defense. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57 (2). pp. 327-355. ISSN 0022-0027

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Abstract

Surprisingly high levels of within-group cooperation are observed in conflict situations. Experiments confirm that external threats lead to higher cooperation. The psychological literature suggests proximate explanations in the form of group processes, but does not explain how these processes can evolve and persist. The authors provide an ultimate explanation, in which cooperation is a rational response to an external threat. In the model, groups vary in their willingness to help each other against external attackers. Attackers infer cooperativeness of groups from members' behavior under attack and may be deterred by a group that bands together against an initial attack. Then, even self-interested individuals may defend each other when threatened in order to deter future attacks. A group's reputation is a public good with a natural weakest-link structure. The model extends to cooperative and altruistic behavior in general.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	collective reputation,conflict,cooperation,defense,signaling,business, management and accounting(all),sociology and political science,political science and international relations ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1400
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences
Related URLs:	http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?...
Depositing User:	LivePure Connector
Date Deposited:	19 Jul 2022 15:30
Last Modified:	13 May 2024 14:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/86627
DOI:	10.1177/0022002712445745

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