Using team discussions to understand behavior in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games

Cooper, David J. and Kagel, John H. (2022) Using team discussions to understand behavior in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. ISSN 1945-7669 (In Press)

[img]
Preview
PDF (Cooper and Kagel, Using Team Discussions to Understand Behavior in IRPD Games, June 2022) - Accepted Version
Download (1MB) | Preview

Abstract

We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices, and how these choices come about. There are three main findings: (1) Teams learned to cooperate faster than individuals, and cooperation was more stable for teams. (2) Strategies identified from team dialogues differ from those identified by the Strategy Frequency Estimation Method. This reflects the improvisational nature of teams’ decision making. (3) Increasing cooperation was primarily driven by teams unilaterally cooperating in the hope of inducing their opponent to cooperate.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Funding information: Financial support was partially provided by NSF grants SES 1630288, SES 1630194, SES 2018704 and SES 2018690. Opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations offered here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
Uncontrolled Keywords: infinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games,team decision making,analysis of team discussions,4* ,/dk/atira/pure/researchoutput/REFrank/4_
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 05 Jul 2022 10:30
Last Modified: 11 Jul 2022 00:17
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/85948
DOI:

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item