Cooper, David J. and Kagel, John H. (2023) Using team discussions to understand behavior in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15 (4). pp. 114-145. ISSN 1945-7669
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Abstract
We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices and how these choices come about. There are three main findings: (i) Teams learned to cooperate faster than individuals, and cooperation was more stable for teams. (ii) Strategies identified from team dialogues differ from those identified by the Strategy Frequency Estimation Method. This reflects the improvisational nature of teams’ decision making. (iii) Increasing cooperation was primarily driven by teams unilaterally cooperating in the hope of inducing their opponent to cooperate.
Item Type: | Article |
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Additional Information: | Funding information: Financial support was partially provided by NSF grants SES 1630288, SES 1630194, SES 2018704 and SES 2018690. Opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations offered here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | infinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games,team decision making,analysis of team discussions,c92),(jel c72,c73,economics, econometrics and finance(all),4* ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000 |
Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences |
Related URLs: | |
Depositing User: | LivePure Connector |
Date Deposited: | 05 Jul 2022 10:30 |
Last Modified: | 09 Apr 2024 09:30 |
URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/85948 |
DOI: | 10.1257/mic.20210012 |
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