Moffatt, Peter G. and Zevallos, Graciela (2021) A Kuhn–Tucker model for behaviour in dictator games. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 7. 226–243. ISSN 2199-6784

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Abstract

We consider a dictator game experiment in which dictators perform a sequence of giving tasks and taking tasks. The data is used to estimate the parameters of a Stone-Geary utility function over own-payoff and other’s payoff. The econometric model incorporates zero observations (e.g. zero-giving or zero-taking) by applying the Kuhn-Tucker theorem and treating zeros as corner solutions in the dictator’s constrained optimisation problem. The method of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) is used for estimation. We find that selfishness is significantly lower in taking tasks than in giving tasks, and we attribute this difference to the “cold prickle of taking”.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User:	LivePure Connector
Date Deposited:	12 Nov 2021 02:03
Last Modified:	24 May 2022 14:41
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/82057
DOI:	10.1007/s40881-021-00110-y

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