Moffatt, Peter G. and Zevallos, Graciela (2021) A Kuhn–Tucker model for behaviour in dictator games. Journal of the Economic Science Association-JESA, 7. 226–243. ISSN 2199-6784
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Abstract
We consider a dictator game experiment in which dictators perform a sequence of giving tasks and taking tasks. The data is used to estimate the parameters of a Stone-Geary utility function over own-payoff and other’s payoff. The econometric model incorporates zero observations (e.g. zero-giving or zero-taking) by applying the Kuhn-Tucker theorem and treating zeros as corner solutions in the dictator’s constrained optimisation problem. The method of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) is used for estimation. We find that selfishness is significantly lower in taking tasks than in giving tasks, and we attribute this difference to the “cold prickle of taking”.
Item Type: | Article |
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Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences > Research Centres > Norwich Institute for Healthy Aging Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Applied Econometrics And Finance Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences |
Depositing User: | LivePure Connector |
Date Deposited: | 12 Nov 2021 02:03 |
Last Modified: | 07 Aug 2024 01:12 |
URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/82057 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s40881-021-00110-y |
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