Project financing versus corporate financing under asymmetric information

Miglo, Anton (2010) Project financing versus corporate financing under asymmetric information. Journal of Business & Economics Research, 8 (8). pp. 23-43. ISSN 2157-8893

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Abstract

In recent years, financing through the creation of an independent project company or financing by non-recourse debt has become an important part of corporate decisions. Shah and Thakor (JET,1987) argue that project financing can be optimal when asymmetric information exists between firms’ insiders and market participants. In contrast to that paper, we provide an asymmetric information argument for project financing without relying on corporate taxes, costly information production or an assumption that firms have the same means of return. In addition, the model generates new predictions regarding asset securitization.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	asymmetric information, non-recourse debt, project financing, asset securitization
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User:	LivePure Connector
Date Deposited:	28 Oct 2021 00:50
Last Modified:	04 Mar 2024 18:07
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/81906
DOI:	10.19030/jber.v8i8.749

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