The Pizza Night Game: Conflict of Interest and Payoff Inequality in Tacit Bargaining Games with Focal Points

Isoni, Andrea, Sugden, Robert and Zheng, Jiwei (2020) The Pizza Night Game: Conflict of Interest and Payoff Inequality in Tacit Bargaining Games with Focal Points. European Economic Review. ISSN 0014-2921

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Abstract

We report the results of a new tacit bargaining experiment that provides two key insights about the effects of payoff inequality on coordination and cooperation towards efficient outcomes. The experiment features the novel Pizza Night game, which can disentangle the effects of payoff inequality and conflict of interest. When coordination relies on focal points based on labelling properties, payoff inequality does not interfere with the successful use of those properties. When there are efficiency cues that assist coordination, payoff inequality is not an obstacle to the maximisation of efficiency. Conflict of interest is the main barrier to successful coordination.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: pizza night game,tacit bargaining,conflict of interest,payoff inequality,focal points,economics, econometrics and finance(all) ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Related URLs:
Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 20 Mar 2020 01:29
Last Modified: 30 May 2020 00:02
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/74562
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103428

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