

## Appendix A – Experimental instruction

### Introduction

Welcome and thank you for taking part in this experiment.

Please wait for instructions...

*[oral: I will now take you through the instructions. These will appear on your screen, and I will read them out.]*

*[EXPERIMENTER CLICKS OK]*

### The scenarios

Everyone in the room is receiving exactly the same instructions.

You will be presented with **26** different scenarios, one after the other. Each scenario is an interaction between **you** and an **other** person.

You and the other person will face the same **26** scenarios (but not in the same order – the order in which you face them has been chosen randomly by the computer, separately for each person).

### The real scenario

One of these scenarios is **real**. By this we mean that:

- The computer has randomly paired you with another person in the room. You will never be told who this person is.
- The computer has randomly picked a scenario for the two of you. You will not know which this is until the end of the session.
- The decisions that you and the other person make in this scenario determine how much money each of you will be paid at the end of the session.

Because you will not know which scenario is the real one until you have responded to all of them, you should treat each scenario as if it was the real one. So, when thinking about each scenario, remember that it could be the real one and think about it in isolation from the others.

*[EXPERIMENTER CLICKS OK]*


### An example of a scenario

Each scenario is represented to you with a picture like the one displayed on the screen. We will call this picture a **table**.

In this scenario you and the other person each have a **base**, represented by the red square (for you) and the grey square (for the other person).

There are some **discs** on the table. Each disc has a money value, which can be different for you and the other person. This is indicated by the horizontal line that divides the disc in two halves. The value to each person is contained in the half facing that person's base.



For example, on the table shown on your screen there are two discs, one disc (on the left) worth £1 to You and £2 to the Other person, and the other disc (on the right) worth £2 to You and £1 to the Other person.



*[EXPERIMENTER CLICKS OK]*

How the scenario is seen by each person...

Each person will see the scenario from a red base at the bottom of the screen. Therefore, each person can easily figure out what the other person will be seeing. In this example, this is shown in the picture below.



*[EXPERIMENTER CLICKS OK]*

#### The basic rules

You and the other person have the opportunity to agree on a division of the discs.

You and the other person separately record which discs you propose to take. We will say that you are **claiming** those discs. You can claim as many (or as few) discs as you want. These claims determine whether there is an agreement or not.

There is an agreement if you have not claimed any of the discs that the other person claimed. That is, you and the other person claimed different discs. In this case, you get all the discs that are yours

according to the agreement. You then earn the total of the values of these discs to you (regardless of how much they are worth to the other person).

But if any disc has been claimed by both you and the other person, there is no agreement. In this case, you get no discs and so earn nothing.


*[EXPERIMENTER CLICKS OK]*

#### Claiming discs


Initially, all the discs are white. This indicates that you have not yet made any claims.

You claim a disc by clicking on it with your mouse. If you do this, the disc turns red, and a red line connecting the disk to your base appears on the table.

*[oral: To see how this works, consider the scenario shown on your screen. Click on one of the discs to claim it.]*




*[oral: Now click on the other disc to claim that as well.]*



If you have claimed a disc but change your mind and decide you no longer want to claim it, you simply click on it again. The red line connecting it to your base then disappears, and the disc turns white again.

*[oral: To see how this works, click again on one of the discs you just claimed.]*



*[oral: Try this again a few times.]*

Underneath the table, there will be a ‘SUBMIT’ button. Once you are happy with your claims, you will be able to press this button to confirm your decision and move to the next scenario in the series.

*[oral: If you are satisfied that you understand how to claim and unclaim a disc, press on the OK button.]*

*[EXPERIMENTER CLICKS OK]*

#### Your earnings

When you have finished all 26 scenarios, you will be told which of them was the real one. This scenario will appear on your screen again, and this time you will see both the claims you made and the claims made by the other person. You will not be able to change your claims at this stage.

How much you earn depends on the value of the discs to you, and on the claims made by you and the other person. Remember the rules that determine your earnings:

- There is an agreement if you have not claimed any disc that the other person claimed. That is, you and the other person claimed different discs. In this case, you get all the discs that are yours according to the agreement. You then earn the total of the values of these discs to you (regardless of how much they are worth to the other person).
- But if any disc has been claimed by both you and the other person, there is no agreement. In this case, you get no discs and so earn nothing.

Your earnings will also include a £5 participation fee and will be paid to you in cash straight away.


Receiving your earnings will end your participation in the experiment.

We now show you some examples of how these rules work.

*[EXPERIMENTER CLICKS OK]*

Example 1

Suppose the real scenario is the one shown on the screen, and that your claims and the other person's are as shown.




You claimed both discs and the other person claimed just one disc. In this case, because one disc has been claimed by both you and the other person, there is no agreement. So neither you nor the other person gets any discs, and so both earn nothing.

*[EXPERIMENTER CLICKS OK]*

Example 2

Now suppose your claims and the other person's are as shown.




As in the previous example, because one disc has been claimed by both you and the other person, there is no agreement. So neither you nor the other person gets any discs, and so both earn nothing.

*[EXPERIMENTER CLICKS OK]*

### Example 3

Now suppose your claims and the other person's are as shown.




In this case, no disc has been claimed by both you and the other person, so there is an agreement. You get the disc that is worth £1 to you (and £2 to the other person), and the other person gets the disc worth £1 to them (and £2 to you). Therefore, you each earn £1.

*[oral: The following questions are designed to check your understanding of these rules and other important aspects of the instructions. Please raise your hand if anything is unclear.]*

*[EXPERIMENTER CLICKS OK]*

### Question 1 of 6

Consider the scenario and claims shown on the screen. Your claims and the other person's are as shown. How much do you and the other person earn?



Choose your answer by selecting the appropriate option below.

1. You earn £1 and the other person earns £1

2. You earn nothing and the other person earns nothing
3. You earn £2 and the other person earns £2
4. You earn nothing and the other person earns £2
5. You earn £2 and the other person earns £1

Then press SUBMIT to enter your answer...

Answer to question 1

Your answer is correct.

Press NEXT to proceed...

OR:


Your answer is incorrect. Remember the rules that determine your earnings:

- There is an agreement if you have not claimed any disc that the other person claimed. That is, you and the other person claimed different discs. In this case, you get all the discs that are yours according to the agreement. You then earn the total of the values of these discs to you (regardless of how much they are worth to the other person).
- But if any disc has been claimed by both you and the other person, there is no agreement. In this case, you get no discs and so earn nothing.

Press BACK to try again...

Question 2 of 6

Consider the scenario and claims shown on the screen. Your claims and the other person's are as shown. How much do you and the other person earn?



Choose your answer by selecting the appropriate option below.

1. You earn £1 and the other person earns £1
2. You earn nothing and the other person earns nothing
3. You earn £2 and the other person earns £2

4. You earn nothing and the other person earns £2
5. You earn £2 and the other person earns £1

Then press **SUBMIT** to enter your answer...

**Answer to question 2**

Your answer is correct.

Press **NEXT** to proceed...

OR:


Your answer is incorrect. Remember the rules that determine your earnings:

- There is an agreement if you have not claimed any disc that the other person claimed. That is, you and the other person claimed different discs. In this case, you get all the discs that are yours according to the agreement. You then earn the total of the values of these discs to you (regardless of how much they are worth to the other person).
- But if any disc has been claimed by both you and the other person, there is no agreement. In this case, you get no discs and so earn nothing.

Press **BACK** to try again...

**Question 3 of 6**

Consider the scenario and claims shown on the screen. Your claims and the other person's are as shown. How much do you and the other person earn?



Choose your answer by selecting the appropriate option below.

1. You earn £1 and the other person earns £1
2. You earn nothing and the other person earns nothing
3. You earn £2 and the other person earns £2
4. You earn nothing and the other person earns £2
5. You earn £2 and the other person earns £1

Then press SUBMIT to enter your answer...

Answer to question 3

Your answer is correct.

Press NEXT to proceed...

OR:

Your answer is incorrect. Remember the rules that determine your earnings:

- There is an agreement if you have not claimed any disc that the other person claimed. That is, you and the other person claimed different discs. In this case, you get all the discs that are yours according to the agreement. You then earn the total of the values of these discs to you (regardless of how much they are worth to the other person).
- But if any disc has been claimed by both you and the other person, there is no agreement. In this case, you get no discs and so earn nothing.

Press BACK to try again...

Question 4 of 6

Your earnings from the experiment will be:

1. The sum of your earnings from all the scenarios
2. The sum of your earnings from all the scenarios, plus the participation fee of £5
3. The amount you earn in the real scenario, plus the participation fee of £5
4. The amount you earn in the real scenario

Click on the correct answer, then press SUBMIT...

Answer to Question 4

Your answer is correct.

Press NEXT to proceed...

OR

Your answer is incorrect.

You will be paid your earnings in the real scenario plus the participation fee.

Press BACK to try again...

Question 5 of 6

For the real scenario, you will see the other person's claims:

1. While you are deciding on your claims
2. Immediately after submitting your claims for that scenario
3. At the end of the experiment

Click on the correct answer, then press SUBMIT...

Answer to question 5

Your answer is correct.

Press NEXT to proceed...

OR

Your answer is incorrect.

You will only see the other person's claims at the end of the experiment.

Press BACK to try again...

Question 6 of 6

The order of the scenarios for the person you have been matched with will be:

1. Chosen randomly by the computer
2. The same order as yours
3. The opposite order to yours

Click on the correct answer, then press SUBMIT...

Answer to question 6

Your answer is correct.

Please wait...

OR

Your answer is incorrect.

The order in which you face the scenarios has been chosen randomly by the computer, separately for each person.

Press BACK to try again...

Ready to start

We are now ready to start the experiment. Please raise your hand if you have any questions before we start.

Remember that from now on any of the scenarios you encounter could be the one on which your payment depends. We ask you that you do not communicate with anyone in the room. If you have any problems with your computer, or if you want to ask any questions, please raise your hand and we will come to your desk to assist you.

*[EXPERIMENTER CLICKS OK]*

## Appendix B – Consent Form

### *Information about the experiment*

If you volunteer to do so, you will participate in an experiment which investigates economic decision making. The experiment will last approximately 60 minutes. During this time you will be seated at a computer terminal and will be asked to make various decisions. You will not be subjected to any risks other than those normally associated with working at a computer terminal.

At the end of the experiment you will receive a participation fee of £5. Depending on the decisions you have made, on chance and on decisions that other participants have made, you may receive a payment in addition to the participation fee. There is no possibility that you will lose money. Additional payments in studies like this one have varied from zero to £22.

At the start of the experiment, you will be asked to provide some basic information about yourself (e.g. age, gender, nationality) which can be used anonymously to investigate whether, for example, male and female participants behave differently. However, you will not be asked to provide any sensitive personal data (e.g. about your health, sexual lifestyle, ethnicity, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, illegal activity, or criminal record). Each participant will be assigned an arbitrary identification number, specific to this experiment, which will be used in storing, analysing and reporting the data. The data will be used only for research purposes and may be reported in research publications and made available to other researchers. These data will be entirely anonymous.

When you signed up to the online database of the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, you gave us your name, gender, and campus card number. We will keep a record on this database of the fact that you took part in this experiment. For accounting purposes, we will also need to ask you to sign a receipt for any money that we pay you. This information, which may be kept indefinitely, will be stored securely and used only for administrative and auditing purposes. Your participation in the experiment, and the decisions you take in it, will have no effect on your relationship with the University of East Anglia as a student or employee.

Please read the following paragraph taken from the instructions for today's study:

‘It is important that you remain silent and do not look at what other participants are doing. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you may be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.’

Participation in the experiment is voluntary. We ask you to stay to the end of the session, out of consideration for the experimenters and for other participants. You will receive a payment only if you complete the experiment. However, you have the right to leave at any time without giving any reason.

This experiment has been approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the School of Economics, following principles that harmonise with policies of the University of East Anglia, the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and the European Research Council, as well as with best practices in the profession. Our procedures for protecting personal information are in accordance with approved practice at the University of East Anglia and meet the University's obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998.

*Consent to participate*

I have read and understood the ‘Information about the experiment’ document and agree to participate in the experiment.

Full name:

Signature:

Date:

## Appendix C - Detailed experimental design

### Payoff pair

In our experiment, 200 subjects were equally divided into four subsamples. Table C1 reports the way the payoff pairs were counterbalanced among game types for both the versions with labelling cues and the versions without.


**Table C1**

Game	Subsample 1	Subsample 2	Subsample 3	Subsample 4
Pure Coordination and Pizza Night	{10, 11}	{4, 17}	{6, 15}	{8, 13}
Battle of the Sexes and HiLo	{8, 13}	{10, 11}	{4, 17}	{6, 15}
Hi-Unequal	{6, 15}	{8, 13}	{10, 11}	{4, 17}
Lo-Unequal	{4, 17}	{6, 15}	{8, 13}	{10, 11}

### Layout

As in Isoni et al. (2018), each scenario could be presented in a number of different layouts (i.e. with the two discs in different positions). The differences between layouts did not affect the presence or absence of labelling cues. Figure C1 shows an example of a layout for a game with labelling cues in which both the close and the far discs appear to the left of the ‘You’ base. The numbers next to the bargaining table are coordinates (not seen by subjects), which will be used to define the layouts used in the experiment. These layouts are reported in Table C2, where L and R are used to indicate whether a disc appears to the left or to the right relative to the ‘You’ base. Figure C1 is an LL layout. Each layout has a logical match, which is also listed in Table C2.

Figure C1



**Table C2**

Layouts for games with labelling cues	Close disc		Far disc		Match
	Col	Row	Col	Row	
LL	-2	-2	-2	2	RR
RR	2	-2	2	2	LL
LR	-2	-2	2	2	LR
RL	2	-2	-2	2	RL

Layouts for games without labelling cues	Leftmost disc		Rightmost disc		Match
	Col	Row	Col	Row	
LL	-3	0	-1	0	LL
RR	1	0	3	0	RR
LR	-2	0	2	0	LR

**Correspondence of games with and without labelling cues**

As noted at the end of Section 2 of the paper, three pairs of games with salient labels (Hi\*Lo and HiLo\*; Hi\*Lo≠ and HiLo≠\*; and Hi≠\*Lo and Hi≠Lo\*) differ only in terms of which equilibrium is label-salient, and removing the salient label produces a single game without labelling cues. In our implementation of the games without labelling cues, we counterbalanced which disc appeared to the left of t

## Appendix D – Summary of coordination success, broken down by payoff pairs

**Table D1**

Payoff pair	Labelling cues		No labelling cues	
	Game	MECS	Game	MECS
{10, 11}	PC*	0.74	PC	0.44
	PN*	0.76	PN	0.44
	BS*	0.46	BS	0.27
	Hi*Lo	0.70	HiLo	0.74
	HiLo*	0.67		
	Hi*Lo≠	0.72	HiLo≠	0.66
	HiLo≠*	0.59		
	Hi≠*Lo	0.87	Hi≠Lo	0.81
	Hi≠Lo*	0.58		

**Table D2**

Payoff pair	Labelling cues		No labelling cues	
	Game	MECS	Game	MECS
{8, 13}	PC*	0.80	PC	0.48
	PN*	0.75	PN	0.45
	BS*	0.50	BS	0.45
	Hi*Lo	0.71	HiLo	0.80
	HiLo*	0.63		
	Hi*Lo≠	0.87	HiLo≠	0.72
	HiLo≠*	0.68		
	Hi≠*Lo	0.80	Hi≠Lo	0.79
	Hi≠Lo*	0.75		

**Table D3**

Payoff pair	Labelling cues		No labelling cues	
	Game	MECS	Game	MECS
{6, 15}	PC*	0.85	PC	0.47
	PN*	0.76	PN	0.47
	BS*	0.48	BS	0.42
	Hi*Lo	0.78	HiLo	0.75
	HiLo*	0.66		
	Hi*Lo≠	0.77	HiLo≠	0.76
	HiLo≠*	0.75		
	Hi≠Lo	0.73	Hi≠Lo	0.71
	Hi≠Lo*	0.62		

**Table D4**

Payoff pair	Labelling cues		No labelling cues	
	Game	MECS	Game	MECS
{4, 17}	PC*	0.78	PC	0.44
	PN*	0.64	PN	0.39
	BS*	0.60	BS	0.37
	Hi*Lo	0.92	HiLo	0.78
	HiLo*	0.65		
	Hi*Lo≠	0.83	HiLo≠	0.83
	HiLo≠*	0.71		
	Hi≠Lo	0.80	Hi≠Lo	0.72
	Hi≠Lo*	0.68		

## Appendix E – Single disc (close or left) claim proportions, broken down by layouts

**Table E1**

Game	View	LL	LR	RL	Chi square test	
PC*	C1 = {(S, S)*, (S, S)} and C2 = {(L, L)*, (L, L)}	0.95	0.91	0.94	p=0.567	
PN*	C3 = {(L, S)*, (L, S)} C4 = {(S, L)*, (S, L)}	0.97 0.88	0.91 0.81	0.92 0.94	0.92 0.88	p=0.724 p=0.299
BS*	C5 = {(L, S)*, (S, L)} C6 = {(S, L)*, (L, S)}	0.52 0.75	0.59 0.76	0.50 0.64	0.66 0.65	p=0.370 p=0.464
Hi*Lo	C7 = {(L, L)*, (S, S)}	0.89	0.86	0.91	0.90	p=0.895
HiLo*	C8 = {(S, S)*, (L, L)}	0.27	0.18	0.21	0.13	p=0.425
Hi*Lo $\neq$	C9 = {(L, L)*, (L, S)} C10 = {(L, L)*, (S, L)}	0.91 0.94	0.87 0.91	0.96 0.92	0.86 0.87	p=0.280 p=0.681
HiLo $\neq$ *	C11 = {(L, S)*, (L, L)} C12 = {(S, L)*, (L, L)}	0.18 0.21	0.16 0.17	0.17 0.23	0.12 0.17	p=0.874 p=0.848
Hi $\neq$ Lo	C13 = {(L, S)*, (S, S)} C14 = {(S, L)*, (S, S)}	0.90 0.90	0.93 0.95	0.86 0.90	0.94 0.86	p=0.570 p=0.551
Hi $\neq$ Lo*	C15 = {(S, S)*, (L, S)} C16 = {(S, S)*, (S, L)}	0.21 0.21	0.20 0.23	0.22 0.18	0.15 0.10	p=0.822 p=0.442

Note: Fisher's exact test gives similar results

**Table E2**

Game	View	LL	RR	LR	Chi square test
PC	N1 = {(S, S), (S, S)} and N2 = {(L, L), (L, L)}	0.57	0.34	0.38	p=0.001
PN	N3 = {(L, S), (L, S)} N4 = {(S, L), (S, L)}	0.45 0.60	0.33 0.28	0.40 0.41	p=0.360 p=0.001
BS	N5 = {(L, S), (S, L)}	0.49	0.56	0.47	p=0.579
HiLo	N6 = {(L, L), (S, S)}	0.53	0.52	0.49	p=0.906
HiLo $\neq$	N7 = {(L, L), (L, S)} N8 = {(L, L), (S, L)}	0.53 0.57	0.53 0.47	0.46 0.46	p=0.638 p=0.418
Hi $\neq$ Lo	N9 = {(L, S), (S, S)} N10 = {(S, L), (S, S)}	0.40 0.53	0.50 0.36	0.43 0.44	p=0.518 p=0.158

Note: Fisher's exact test gives similar results

## Appendix F – Actual coordination success

**Table F1**

Labelling cues		No labelling cues	
Game	Actual coordination success	Game	Actual coordination success
PC*	0.79	PC	0.49
PN*	0.73	PN	0.50
BS*	0.49	BS	0.34
Hi*Lo	0.83	HiLo	0.77
HiLo*	0.67		
Hi*Lo≠	0.79	HiLo≠	0.72
HiLo≠*	0.68		
Hi≠Lo	0.80	Hi≠Lo	0.73
Hi≠Lo*	0.64		

**Table F2**

Hypothesis	Game 1 vs Game 2	P-value
H1	PC* vs BS*	p<0.001
H2	PN* vs BS*	p<0.001
H3	PC* vs PN*	p=0.077
H4 (a)	HiLo vs Hi≠Lo	p=0.182
H4 (b)	Hi*Lo vs Hi≠*Lo	p=0.120
	HiLo* vs Hi≠Lo*	p=0.432
H5 (a)	HiLo≠ vs HiLo	p=0.118
H5 (b)	Hi*Lo≠ vs Hi*Lo	p=0.199
	HiLo*≠ vs HiLo*	p=0.862

Note: p-values are from Wilcoxon signed-rank test.

## Appendix G – Order effects regression results

### VARIABLES

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Previous PN payoff difference	-0.0152
	(0.0267)
Absolute BS payoff difference	0.0570
	(0.0518)
Constant	-0.286
	(0.465)

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Observations	90
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The dependent variable is whether the subject chose the more valuable disc in BS.


Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Appendix H – Screenshots for games with and without labelling cues

Figure H1

Scenario 3 out of 26



Click on any disc you want to claim and then press the SUBMIT button.

Remember that the other person will be making claims too.


The basic rules are:

- There is an agreement if you have not claimed any disc that the other person claimed. That is, you and the other person claimed different discs. In this case, you get all the discs that are yours according to the agreement. You then earn the total of the values of these discs to you (regardless of how much they are worth to the other person).
- But if any disc has been claimed by both you and the other person, there is no agreement. In this case, you get no discs and so earn nothing.

**SUBMIT**

Figure H2

Scenario 5 out of 26



Click on any disc you want to claim and then press the SUBMIT button.

Remember that the other person will be making claims too.

The basic rules are:

- There is an agreement if you have not claimed any disc that the other person claimed. That is, you and the other person claimed different discs. In this case, you get all the discs that are yours according to the agreement. You then earn the total of the values of these discs to you (regardless of how much they are worth to the other person).
- But if any disc has been claimed by both you and the other person, there is no agreement. In this case, you get no discs and so earn nothing.

**SUBMIT**