A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning

Dietrich, Franz, Staras, Antonios and Sugden, Robert (2019) A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning. Journal of Philosophy, 116 (11). pp. 585-614. ISSN 0022-362X

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Abstract

John Broome has developed an account of rationality and reasoning which gives philosophical foundations for choice theory and the psychology of rational agents. We formalize his account into a model that differs from ordinary choice-theoretic models through focusing on psychology and the reasoning process. Within that model, we ask Broome's central question of whether reasoning can make us more rational: whether it allows us to acquire transitive preferences, consistent beliefs, non-akratic intentions, and so on. We identify three structural types of rationality requirements: consistency requirements, completeness requirements, and closedness requirements. Many standard rationality requirements fall under this typology. Based on three theorems, we argue that reasoning is successful in achieving closedness requirements, but not in achieving consistency or completeness requirements. We assess how far our negative results reveal gaps in Broome's theory, or deficiencies in choice theory and behavioural economics.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	broome,rationality,reasoning,economics, econometrics and finance(all),arts and humanities(all) ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences
Depositing User:	LivePure Connector
Date Deposited:	21 Jun 2019 06:33
Last Modified:	20 Apr 2023 07:33
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/71504
DOI:	10.5840/jphil20191161138

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