Coordination and transfer

Cooper, David J. and Van Huyck, John (2018) Coordination and transfer. Experimental Economics, 21 (3). 487–512. ISSN 1386-4157

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Abstract

We study the ability of subjects to transfer principles between related coordination games. Subjects play a class of order statistic coordination games closely related to the well-known minimum (or weak-link) and median games (Van Huyck et al. in Am Econ Rev 80:234–248, 1990, Q J Econ 106(3):885–910, 1991). When subjects play a random sequence of games with differing order statistics, play is less sensitive to the order statistic than when a fixed order statistic is used throughout. This is consistent with the prediction of a simple learning model with transfer. If subjects play a series of similar stag hunt games, play converges to the payoff dominant equilibrium when a convention emerges, replicating the main result of Rankin et al. (Games Econ Behav 32:315–337, 2000). When these subjects subsequently play a random sequence of order statistic games, play is shifted towards the payoff dominant equilibrium relative to subjects without previous experience. The data is consistent with subjects absorbing a general principle, play of the payoff dominant equilibrium, and applying it in a new related setting.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	coordination,transfer,learning
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Related URLs:	http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10683-...
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	31 May 2018 09:30
Last Modified:	20 Apr 2023 23:44
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/67255
DOI:	10.1007/s10683-017-9521-8

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