Cooper, David J. and Kühn, Kai-Uwe (2014) Communication, renegotiation, and the scope for collusion. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6 (2). pp. 247-278. ISSN 1945-7669
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Abstract
We study the effect of communication in an experimental game where cooperation is consistent with equilibrium play if players share an understanding that cheating will be punished. Consistent with communication acting as a coordinating device, credible preplay threats to punish cheating are the most effective message to facilitate collusion. Promises to collude also improve cooperation. Credible threats do not occur in a treatment with a limited message space that permits threats of punishment. Contrary to some theoretical predictions, renegotiation possibilities facilitate collusion.
Item Type: | Article |
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Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Industrial Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics |
Related URLs: | |
Depositing User: | Pure Connector |
Date Deposited: | 16 Apr 2018 14:30 |
Last Modified: | 10 Jul 2023 15:30 |
URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66777 |
DOI: | 10.1257/mic.6.2.247 |
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