Fatas, Enrique and Morales, Antonio J. (2018) The joy of ruling: an experimental investigation on collective giving. Theory and Decision, 85 (2). 179–200. ISSN 0040-5833
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Abstract
We analyse team dictator games with different voting mechanisms in the laboratory. Individuals vote to select a donation for all group members. Standard Bayesian analysis makes the same prediction for all three mechanisms: participants should cast the same vote regardless of the voting mechanism used to determine the common donation level. Our experimental results show that subjects fail to choose the same vote. We show that their behaviour is consistent with a joy of ruling: individuals get an extra utility when they determine the voting outcome.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | public goods,voting,joy of ruling |
Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
Depositing User: | Pure Connector |
Date Deposited: | 16 Mar 2018 16:30 |
Last Modified: | 22 Oct 2022 03:34 |
URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66524 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s11238-017-9646-4 |
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