A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism About Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux

Andow, James (2017) A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism About Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux. Metaphilosophy, 48 (1-2). pp. 183-195. ISSN 0026-1068

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Abstract

Bernard Molyneux presents some new arguments against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions. Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Molyneux's arguments are that: (1) the propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited; (2) intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as evidence; and (3) certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are treated as inadmissible in the context of justification. This article presents a partial defence of descriptive evidentialism against these new arguments.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: intuitions,metaphilosophy,philosophical methodology,evidence,descriptive evidentialism,epistemology of philosophy,defence of intuitions
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies
University of East Anglia > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
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Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2018 15:30
Last Modified: 28 Jul 2020 00:02
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66007
DOI: 10.1111/meta.12225

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