

**A PARTIAL DEFENCE OF DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENTIALISM
ABOUT INTUITIONS:
A REPLY TO MOLYNEUX**

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Abstract: Bernard Molyneux presents some new arguments against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions. Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Molyneux's arguments are that: (1) the propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited; (2) intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as evidence; and (3) certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are treated as inadmissible in the context of justification. This article presents a partial defence of descriptive evidentialism against these new arguments.

Keywords: intuitions, metaphilosophy, philosophical methodology, evidence, descriptive evidentialism, epistemology of philosophy, defence of intuitions, intuitions.

1. Introduction

Consider three different articles I might have written in place of this one. Suppose that all three articles present plausible cases for their stated conclusions.

1. An article arguing that philosophers don't rely on telescopes.
2. An article arguing that philosophers don't use arguments—in which “use arguments” is used as shorthand for “use heated debate as a way to exhaust one's critics long enough to bash them over the head.”
3. An article arguing that philosophers don't use arguments—in which “use arguments” is used in a more conventional way.

I'd hope that only the last of these would stand any chance of getting through the review process. The first paper simply isn't of any philosophical interest. It might stimulate curiosity as to why on earth anyone would ever feel the need to publicly make the case that philosophers

didn't use telescopes, but that's about it in terms of interest. The second paper, again, isn't really of any interest. The slight difference is that this time the language of the paper might suggest the paper was more interesting than it actually is. Who would deny that philosophers use arguments? Everyone accepts that! If there were good reasons to think everyone was mistaken, it would be important for any paper articulating those reasons to be given a good airing! The third paper is different. It would be important for any paper articulating good reasons to think philosophers don't use arguments to be given a good airing.

A number of books and papers have recently argued against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions in philosophy (e.g., Cappelen 2012, 2014; Deutsch 2010, 2015; Earlenbaugh and Molyneux 2009; Ichikawa 2014). Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. We can call those who argue against descriptive evidentialism "intuition deniers" (following Nado 2015). Debates about intuitions in philosophy are difficult for many reasons. One of them is that many different ways of thinking about intuitions are available to us.¹ Another is that, independent of the fact that there are many ways of thinking about intuitions available, there are many ways of understanding the claim that *philosophers use intuitions*. This means that those arguing against descriptive evidentialism run the risk of appearing—at least to those who argue for or unreflectively accept descriptive evidentialism—to offer a paper rather like the one I might have written that only *looks* as if it argues that philosophers don't use arguments (due to an eccentric reading of "arguments").² For example, when the intuition denier Cappelen (2012) understands descriptive evidentialism as making a claim about some method that is distinctive to philosophy, those of us who don't share the sense that descriptive evidentialism is naturally interpreted as making such a claim can be left feeling that Cappelen's arguments somehow miss their target.³

Given this background, it is worth paying close attention to intuition-denying arguments that take as their target a fairly straightforward reading of the claim that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Bernard Molyneux's recent arguments in "New Arguments That Philosophers Don't Treat Intuitions as Evidence" (2014) are, by this token, worth considering closely. Molyneux's strategy is to consider a number of examples in which intuitions undeniably play a role in philosophy, and in fairly typical ways, but where there is some problem with interpreting those uses as *uses as evidence*.

Molyneux raises three main considerations:

¹ This also distracts the debate in other ways, which I discuss in Andow 2015c.

² I make a similar point in Andow 2016.

³ And there are independent reasons for doubting that philosophers use intuitions in a distinctive way (Andow a, b).

Insufficiency. The propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited.

Liberal applicability. Intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as evidence.

Anomalous inadmissibility. Certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are treated as inadmissible in the context of justification.

These considerations are important. If Molyneux is right, then the pressure against the view that philosophers use intuitions as evidence is greater than ever.

In this article, I aim to make some trouble for Molyneux's arguments. This is done in a constructive spirit. I am not unsympathetic to the idea that the sorts of considerations Molyneux raises put pressure on descriptive evidentialism. Nonetheless, I will argue as follows: (a) Molyneux's case for *insufficiency* and *liberal applicability* doesn't work as it is; and (b), concerning *anomalous inadmissibility*, the cases of inadmissibility Molyneux identifies are not anomalous because they are perfectly explicable by the proponent of descriptive evidentialism about intuitions.

2. Insufficiency

This is Molyneux's claim: The propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited.

The main point Molyneux raises in favour of this claim is that, in cases where p putatively enjoys evidential support from intuitions, the justification for p is not undermined by attacks on the claim that p is intuitive. This point is intended as a sociological one: as a matter of fact, when philosophers encounter evidence that a claim they take to enjoy intuitive evidential support is not intuitive, their attitude to the claim itself doesn't change, for example, by reducing credence.⁴

I suspect that this sociological claim is false. Molyneux uses a single example to make his case: the supposedly intuitive proposition that p is possible only if not- p is not necessary. This particular example is an atypical example of a proposition that philosophers take to enjoy

⁴ We could understand the claim as an epistemic one: the fact that p is not intuitive doesn't undermine the epistemic standing of p (where p is something philosophers typically take to enjoy evidential support from intuition). Such a claim, however, wouldn't help establish Molyneux's claim, *insufficiency*, or put pressure on any claims about what philosophers actually do.

intuitive support. More typical examples of propositions that enjoy intuitive support are particular claims with no modal content, for example, about cases, artworks, trolley problems, sentences, and so on. In order to put pressure on the idea that the *typical* use of intuitions in philosophy is as evidence, we will also need to consider more typical cases. In particular, we need to ask the following. Is it the case that, with respect to more typical cases, evidence that claims philosophers take to enjoy intuitive evidential support are not intuitive doesn't reduce philosophers' credence in the claims themselves? It is clear that there is some work to do here. There are countless cases in the literature that seem to involve philosophers trying to accommodate propositions that they come to believe are intuitive or reducing the weight they give to propositions that turn out not to be intuitive, and countless anecdotes about philosophers conducting casual surveys of their classes and audiences to check that the claims that they are relying on are intuitive. So, absent empirical findings to the contrary, I'm inclined to think the defender of Molyneux's strategy has some work to do where these more typical cases are involved.

Moreover, I even remain unconvinced about Molyneux's more atypical example. I don't deny that general and modal claims are typically taken to enjoy intuitive support by philosophers. But it is worth thinking about the two ways this happens. Molyneux discusses what we might call direct intuitional support. A general and modal claim is supported by the intuition with that content. It is often the case, however, that some, most, or all support for such claims comes more indirectly. The intuitive support one has for accepting modal and general claims often comes via intuitions about numerous actual and counterfactual cases or via having intuitions about numerous particular claims (which may have no obvious modal content).

Molyneux asks whether philosophers would be inclined to change their attitude to the proposition *p is possible only if not-p is not necessary* when confronted with evidence that the supposed intuitive support isn't in fact intuitive. He might be right about the case in which philosophers are confronted with evidence that *that very proposition* is not intuitive. But ask yourself whether philosophers would be inclined to change their attitude to the very same proposition if confronted with evidence that, for lots of particular claims p_1 – p_n , most people find it incredibly intuitive both that p_i is possible and that *not-p_i* is necessary. Now, I don't for a moment think that most people have such intuitions, but that is beside the point for my argument. Ask yourself the following question: What do you think philosophers would do were they to become genuinely convinced that such contents—that many particular propositions are both possible and their negations necessary—are genuinely intuitive? I think it is far from clear that philosophers' attitudes to the claim that *p is possible only if not-p is not*

necessary wouldn't change. So, I don't think that the sociological claim Molyneux requires should be granted even if restricted to his atypical case.

Maybe I have been unfair. When Molyneux considers attacks on the claim that p is intuitive, he considers a rather different kind of attack from that which I have been considering. He considers attacks like the following: "For example, the classical Platonist might argue that we don't intuit [p]; rather, we recall it. And the contemporary nativist, similarly, may suppose that [p] is not intuited but abstracted from our native beliefs. An empiricist might argue that [p], rather than being intuited, is extracted from lessons learned via past experience, in which it was implicit. And the attitude eliminativist, meanwhile, might even claim that there are no such mental states as intuitions" (2014, 447).

That is, Molyneux considers attacks on the idea that the relevant propositional mental state counts as an intuition or that the process via which it was acquired genuinely counts as intuitive. Now, I agree that most philosophers don't downgrade their credence in propositions they take to enjoy intuitive support in light of such arguments and positions. However, I think the reason most philosophers remain unmoved (by such arguments and positions in their credence in propositions they take to enjoy intuitive support) is that they remain unconvinced that the claims and arguments of the Platonist, nativist, empiricist, and eliminativist have got anything going for them. And, if we instead consider the case in which philosophers genuinely become convinced that one of these alternative stories is correct (and convinced that the alternative story suggests no alternative source of support to the support they took the relevant proposition to have in virtue of its being genuinely intuitive), again I think it is far from clear that philosophers' attitudes wouldn't change.

I wouldn't want my aim in the previous few paragraphs to be misunderstood. Ultimately, I am not sure what real methodological progress can be made by speculating about what philosophers would do in counterfactual cases such as those in which philosophers come to genuinely accept particular positions and arguments. Rather, the lesson that I draw from the above discussion is that Molyneux's strategy—arguing that philosophers don't downgrade their credence in propositions they take to enjoy evidential support in the face of evidence that those claims are not intuitive—would do well to pay attention to more typical, everyday cases of propositions that are taken to enjoy intuitive support.

3. Liberal Applicability

This is Molyneux's claim: Intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as evidence.

What are these influences? Molyneux thinks that (1) intuition influences inference. He considers the sociological fact that (2) philosophers are happy to appeal to intuitions in areas of philosophy where noncognitivism is a live option.

I want to set aside the first. Why? Because, although it is natural to think of intuition guiding inference, for example intuition leads us to infer q from p and if p then q , such an influence poses no threat to the general picture assumed by the descriptive evidentialist. Remember, Molyneux's target is a claim about how philosophers use intuitions. Note, in particular, the following aspect of Molyneux's understanding of the descriptive evidentialists' claim: "The claim, then, does not quantify over intuitions, nor even instances where intuitions are used. It quantifies over instances where intuitions are used in the way that has become standard in philosophy. It tells us that such cases should be understood as appeals to evidence. It is that claim that I mean to oppose" (2014, 444).

The reason I set aside the idea that intuition influences inference is that such cases are not instances where "intuitions are used in the way that has become standard in philosophy" in virtue of the fact that they are not *uses* of intuition at all. Using something is rather different from being influenced by it. For instance, take the role that the books on my shelves play in my philosophizing. I do use them. But they affect my philosophizing in many ways that do not involve my using them. My books comfort me. They make me happy. They disguise the despair-provoking stark white walls. They even lend a pleasant fragrance to the air. Without those books surrounding me, I might well have rather different thoughts. But this influence is not a way I am using the books.

Molyneux's point about noncognitivism can't be set aside in this way. Noncognitivism is a live option in many domains. Cognitivists and noncognitivists have different interpretations of what is going on when people think and talk about things in the relevant domains. For example, in ethics, while the cognitivist says moral attitudes have propositional contents, such as "murder is wrong," which can be true or false, the noncognitivist says moral attitudes are nonpropositional and so not truth apt. This creates a problem because many accept that only propositional contents can enjoy *evidential* support. So, if noncognitivism is true of a domain, then descriptive evidentialism about philosophical enquiry in that domain is false.

It is tempting to think that philosophical methodology (of relevant subfields) is simply another domain where cognitivists and noncognitivists should give competing interpretations. Take Molyneux's example: "Suppose I wanted to get you to agree to a proscription against killing, even to save others. Then I could pump an intuition to forbid harvesting a healthy person's organs for transplantation, and invite you to generalize" (2014, 453–54).

What is going on when I appeal to an intuition in this way? Perhaps the cognitivist will want to say that what is going on is that I am using an intuition as evidence. Whereas noncognitivists will have to say something else is going on (although, as Molyneux notes, they can't very well deny that whatever is going on involves an appeal to an intuition). But this leaves descriptive evidentialists in a bit of a bind, according to Molyneux. They are committed to noncognitivism about any domain in which they think their account applies, and yet their claim is meant to be a general one about philosophical methods. Molyneux thinks that it is unsatisfactory for the descriptive evidentialist to simply own a commitment to cognitivism: "The evidentialist could simply deny non-cognitivism. That would be an unfortunate retreat, however, since the right philosophical methodology ought to be compatible with all the open positions. The philosophical method alone should no more tell us which positions are wrong than the judicial procedure alone should tell us which defendants are guilty" (2014, 452).

There's an interesting metamethodological principle that seems to play a role in the argument Molyneux is advancing here. This principle is that the final account of philosophical methods should have no implications for which first-order philosophical positions are correct. There are a few ways of interpreting such a principle. I'm not sure any of them help Molyneux's argument. But let's look at some of the options.

First, the relevant metamethodological principle might be one governing either descriptive or normative methodology. The claim might be that no adequate account of *what philosophers actually do* says that philosophers follow a method that has implications in first-order philosophy. On the other hand, the claim might be that no adequate account of *what philosophers should do* says they follow such a method. Some of Molyneux's choice of words might be taken to suggest the latter. Since descriptive evidentialism is a descriptive thesis, however, the metamethodological principle Molyneux needs to appeal to is something more like the former.

Second, the relevant metamethodological principle might be one about philosophical methods in the sense of something like *a set of rules or procedures that enquirers conceive of themselves as following*. On the other hand, the principle might be about philosophical methods in the sense of *a theoretical description of what enquirers are doing that enquirers themselves might outright reject*. What Molyneux's argument requires is a principle of the latter variety. Descriptive evidentialists and intuition deniers are in the business of getting beyond philosophers' conceptions of their practice and asking whether philosophers' practices actually involve the use of intuitions as evidence. To see this, consider the fact that many philosophers think that they do use

intuitions as evidence provides at best weak and indirect evidence against the views of intuition deniers.

There is something attractive sounding about the type of principle Molyneux advances. I agree, for instance, that there would be something troubling about the situation in which metaethicists sit down and try to work out the best account of moral discourse, and deliberately and knowingly employ a method that they explicitly conceive of in terms that are obviously and straightforwardly incompatible with non-cognitivist views. On the other hand, I am not at all troubled if the final account in descriptive methodology ends up diagnosing that what was going on all the time—at a deeper level—was that cognitivists and noncognitivists alike were using intuitions as evidence. It seems perfectly appropriate for the correct account in descriptive methodology to be hostage to truths about the real nature of the discourse in the field whose methods it aims to describe. For example, it would be very strange if the final and accurate description of philosophical methods ended up being neutral on all issues in epistemology, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, and so on. Thus, I am not persuaded by the aspect of Molyneux's argument that rests on this kind of metamethodological principle.

There are, however, other aspects of the problem that Molyneux thinks the issue of noncognitivism raises for the descriptive evidentialist. He says the argument "is that the use of intuitions in an area of inquiry is insensitive to whether noncognitivism is endorsed and that this cannot be explained on an evidentialist proposal. To provide an emotivist illustration, suppose that I wanted to persuade you not to boo the termination of a pregnancy. Then I might ask if you find it intuitive to boo a person disconnecting herself from a sick violinist. If you say no, I only need to invite you to boo things consistently" (2014, 453). He then adds, "To argue that [such] strategies are attempts to use intuitions as evidence for expressions of emotion . . . one has to commit a category error, since [that is not a kind of thing] that can be supported by evidence. But nor do [such] examples seem to differ radically from how we deploy intuitions quite generally" (2014, 454).

Molyneux is right about the following: If X says that Y is trying to use intuitions as evidence for expressions of emotion, X is making a category error. But no descriptive evidentialists who accept a commitment to cognitivism would make such a claim. Rather, their claim would be that the emotivists are doing exactly the same thing that anyone else is doing—using intuitions as evidence for *propositions*—the only difference being that the emotivists are mistaken about the nature of their practice and their claims. The methodologist who is in trouble is the one who accepts noncognitivism in a domain but maintains that the role of intuitions in the relevant domain is nonetheless evidential. Noncognitivists who unreflectively think their method involves the use

of intuitions as evidence are making a similar mistake. But it is important to note what their mistake is not. Their mistake is not the following: to use intuitions while endorsing noncognitivism. After all, in the same way that the noncognitivist about ethical discourse can reinterpret what is going on when it might seem people have beliefs about whether particular acts are moral, noncognitivists can employ a reinterpretation of what is going on when it might seem their method involves the use of intuitions as evidence. For example, noncognitivists could naturally understand their method in terms of intuitions (understood as nonpropositional attitudes) and some non-truth-involving sense of support broader than evidence.

What I think is right about Molyneux's point here is that descriptive evidentialists as a rule need to say more about the areas of philosophy where noncognitivism is a live option. Do they accept their cognitivist commitments? Do they recognise such commitments as a burden? However, I don't think this issue provides a compelling argument—that is independent of arguments for and against noncognitivism—against descriptive evidentialism.

4. Anomalous Inadmissibility

This is Molyneux's claim: Certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are treated as inadmissible in the context of justification.

There is a difference between, on the one hand, that which persuades us or that which constitutes our justification and, on the other hand, that which we adduce to persuade others or that which we judge to be suitable for such a use. Moreover, the facts we find on one side of the distinction may very well not appear on the other side. Why? Because we judge other people to have different dispositions to us. Suppose I am arguing with a rampant capitalist and ask myself the following question: What evidence should I use to persuade this rampant capitalist to cut his carbon emissions? In this case, it wouldn't make sense for me to assume that the first place to look is my own reasons for thinking it is a good idea for him to cut his carbon emissions, or what I regard to be the most important evidence for that position. This is to say, features of the dialectical situation can rule out making certain types of appeal in the context of justification.

The dialectics of some philosophical debates and discussion are weirder than others. In many philosophical debates, the relevant opponent or interlocutor is imaginary. We often attempt to question and defend positions that no one previously ever thought to deny. The weird thing is that, in this kind of debate, one still has to be charitable to one's opponent. Despite the fact that they don't exist, there are rules about what intuitions you are allowed to suppose she has. You are not

allowed to suppose that everything which is completely obvious to you is also completely obvious to your opponent. With real opponents, you have to find some common ground in order to avoid begging the question when you give your argument. With imaginary opponents, you have to do something similar.

In weird dialectics with imaginary interlocutors, the rules are sometimes unclear. Take certain infamous debates about scepticism. Here's an argument the sceptic might give:

1. I don't know I'm not being deceived by an Evil Demon.
2. If I don't know that, then I don't know that I have hands.
3. So, I don't know that I have hands.

And here's an argument the antisceptic might give:

1. I know that I have hands.
2. If I know that, then I know I'm not being deceived by an Evil Demon.
3. So, I know I'm not being deceived by an Evil Demon.

Is it legitimate to use the second argument to argue against the sceptic? It is easy to get oneself into a mind-set from which it seems that such an argument is not legitimate. There is something pretty unsatisfactory about attempting to refute scepticism by simply weighing the relative intuitiveness of *I know that I have hands* and *I don't know that I am not being deceived*. One way to articulate the unease one might feel about such an argumentative move is to say that it is *uncharitable* to assume that the sceptic would share your relative weighting of the intuitiveness of those propositions. If you are going to seriously attempt to refute the sceptic, is the thought, this isn't the common ground from which to fight. But this isn't the only mind-set available. It is also fairly easy to get oneself into a mind-set from which the Moorean-shift type of move feels perfectly legitimate. In particular, it can feel like the second argument provides perfectly legitimate grounds on which to justify failing to engage the sceptic in any further debate. An opponent who isn't even willing to accept such a basic common ground isn't worth engaging, might be the thought.

For the purposes of my argument, I don't need to arbitrate between these two stances or mind-sets. I don't have any firm opinion about which is the more defensible. Regardless of which mind-set is ultimately the more defensible, this discussion already helps provide a response to Molyneux's argument that the fact that certain strong intuitions are treated as being inadmissible in the context of justification gives us reason to doubt that the standard philosophical use of intuitions is as evidence.

Consider that, while Molyneux doesn't consider the external world sceptic, his examples do all concern sceptics of one stripe or another, for example:

1. *The problem of induction* and the inadmissibility of the intuitiveness of the claim that induction is an epistemically virtuous principle of reasoning and the counterintuitiveness of the claim that counterinduction is not in debates about the epistemic virtue of induction.
2. *Kripkenstein* and the inadmissibility of the intuitiveness of plus-answers and the counterintuitiveness of quus-answers in debates about the meaning of "plus" and thus debates about meaning.
3. *Indeterminacy of translation* and the inadmissibility of the intuitiveness of interpreting "gavagai" as referring to rabbits rather than undetached rabbit parts.

And Molyneux's observation about such debates is that "philosophers do not dismiss these problems so glibly. Why not? If intuitions were standardly used as evidence, then our strong intuitions should have settled these matters long ago. The glib response, in each case, should have been perfectly permissible" (2014, 456).

Now we are in a position to see why not—why philosophers do not dismiss these problems so glibly. In each case, the interlocutor is imaginary. No one thinks counterinduction is the epistemically virtuous principle. No one defends understanding "plus" as quus, "gavagai" as undetached rabbit parts, or inducing from the fact that all observed emeralds have been grue (to use Molyneux's fourth and final example). According to a certain mind-set, however, certain dialectical rules apply despite the fact that our interlocutor is imaginary. According to such a mind-set, for example, if you are going to argue against the various forms of scepticism involved, and to take them seriously, then you cannot make certain assumptions about the common ground. Imagine that I had before me a genuine believer in the idea that plus means quus. It does seem off for us to imagine this individual replete with plus-favouring intuitions. The weirdness of the dialectical situation means that even these basic very strong intuitions are off limits and cannot be deployed in the context of justification. Note that this is completely compatible with thinking that the relevant intuitions do provide very strong evidence, it is just inadmissible given certain assumptions about the way that debates with imaginary sceptics should be conducted.

As with the Moorean-shift example, it is true that there is another mind-set available. According to this alternative mindset the glib response is perfectly appropriate, and there is no obligation to engage with an imaginary sceptic who refuses to admit the greater intuitiveness of the commonsense premise. If all philosophers had such a mind-

set all of the time, then the fact that strong intuitions haven't settled the arguments about all these varieties of scepticism *would* be a real mystery for the descriptive evidentialist to explain. But so long as sufficiently many philosophers find themselves in a mind-set according to which it is *dialectically* unacceptable to respond to sceptics in such ways sufficiently often, then there is no great mystery here for the descriptive evidentialist to explain.

Maybe there are cases in which intuitions are inexplicably treated as being inadmissible. However, these need to be cases in which it is *not* plausible to say that both (1) philosophers do use X intuitions as evidence and (2) dialectical considerations mean that it wouldn't make sense to adduce X intuitions as evidence.⁵

5. Conclusion

I have attempted a partial defence of the claim that the standard use of intuitions in philosophy is as evidence. I have defended this claim against recent arguments by Molyneux that provide, I think, some of the strongest intuition-denying arguments which have been produced to date. It would be a problem for the proponent of the idea that the standard use of intuitions in philosophy is as evidence if examination of actual philosophical practice showed that philosophers' attitudes to the propositions that putatively enjoy intuitive support were typically unchanging in the face of arguments that attack the intuitiveness of those propositions. More work needs to be done, however, to demonstrate that philosophers' attitudes are unresponsive in this way. It would also be a problem for the proponent of the idea that the standard use of intuitions in philosophy is as evidence if examination of philosophical practice showed that typical uses of intuition by philosophers simply do not square with the idea that they were being used *as evidence*. Neither of Molyneux's examples is yet a convincing instance of this, however. Finally, it would also be a problem for the descriptive evidentialist if examination of philosophical practice revealed many cases of strong intuitions inexplicably being treated as being inadmissible in a context of justification. Yet all of Molyneux's cases of inadmissibility can be accounted for by the idea that, despite treating the relevant intuitions *as evidence*, dialectical considerations mean that the

⁵ Note that the same point I am making here might be made with respect to many debates and types of evidence. For similar dialectical reasons, there are certain propositions that you will not find used by brave folks who seriously and wisely engage with conspiracy theorists, flat-earthers, and the like, despite the fact that those propositions are taken to provide very good evidence (and used as evidence in other contexts) by the brave folks concerned.

intuitions can't be *used* as evidence or *adduced* in the relevant contexts.⁶

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⁶ I am far from unsympathetic to Molyneux's overall project. I suspect that many of our standard uses of intuitions are not properly interpreted as uses *as evidence*. For example, intuitions may play an important role in explanation, rather than justification or discovery (Andow 2015a). The present article is just an effort to make trouble for Molyneux's arguments on behalf of descriptive evidentialism.