A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism About Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux

Andow, James (2017) A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism About Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux. Metaphilosophy, 48 (1-2). pp. 183-195. ISSN 0026-1068

Preview

PDF (Published manuscript) - Published Version Available under License Unspecified licence. Download (94kB) | Preview

Abstract

Bernard Molyneux presents some new arguments against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions. Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Molyneux's arguments are that: (1) the propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited; (2) intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as evidence; and (3) certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are treated as inadmissible in the context of justification. This article presents a partial defence of descriptive evidentialism against these new arguments.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	intuitions,metaphilosophy,philosophical methodology,evidence,descriptive evidentialism,epistemology of philosophy,defence of intuitions
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
Related URLs:	http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/meta.12225
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	18 Jan 2018 15:30
Last Modified:	22 Mar 2024 01:19
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66007
DOI:	10.1111/meta.12225

Downloads

Actions (login required)

View Item