Proliferation and Entry Deterrence in Vertically Differentiated Markets

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Lu, Liang (2015) Proliferation and Entry Deterrence in Vertically Differentiated Markets.

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Abstract

We examine the profitability, entry deterrence and welfare effects of proliferation offered by non-cooperative firms competing in quality and price. In a market of one high quality firm and competitive low quality firms, we find that the established high quality firm will not initiate proliferation but may have an incentive to do so if facing entry threats. The proliferation quality is endogenously determined and the industry profit decreases with such proliferation. Moreover, we show that proliferation increases consumer surplus in the same way as entry does. That is, while proliferation to deter entry is anticompetitive, it is not necessarily welfare-reducing.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy
Related URLs:	http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents...
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	29 Jun 2017 08:32
Last Modified:	20 Jun 2023 15:07
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/63974
DOI:

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