Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture

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Hougaard, Jens Lars, Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., Tvede, Mich and Østerdal, Lars Peter (2017) Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture. Games and Economic Behavior, 102. pp. 98-110. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where revenue ‘bubbles up’ in the hierarchy. The family is flexible enough to accommodate the no-transfer rule where no revenue bubbles up) and the full-transfer rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy). Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of popular incentive mechanisms for social mobilization or multi-level marketing.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	hierarchies,joint ventures,resource allocation,geometric rules,mit strategy
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory
Related URLs:	http://eprint.ncl.ac.uk/pub_details2.asp... https://eprint.ncl.ac.uk/pub_details2.as... http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/art...
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	09 May 2017 05:08
Last Modified:	24 Aug 2023 00:14
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/63403
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.016

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