Communication compatible voting rules

Thordal-Le Quement, Mark (2013) Communication compatible voting rules. Theory and Decision, 74 (4). 479–507. ISSN 0040-5833

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Abstract

We reassess the possibility of full information pooling in a Condorcet jury environment featuring heterogeneous and privately known preference types. We find that in general, with uncorrelated preference types, only very limited heterogeneity is compatible with full pooling. We provide a sufficient condition, based on a simple measure of preference misalignment, under which the set of voting rules compatible with full pooling is at most a singleton. As a caveat to any simplistic conclusions, we identify a case in which an increase in heterogeneity (i.e. polarization) systematically generates the possibility of full pooling. Increased jury size, in contrast, is shown to always render full pooling more difficult.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	committees,communication,strategic voting
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Industrial Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	12 Apr 2017 05:10
Last Modified:	16 Oct 2025 12:32
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/63226
DOI:	10.1007/s11238-012-9329-0

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