Subgroup deliberation and voting

Thordal-Le Quement, Mark and Yokeeswaran, Venuga (2015) Subgroup deliberation and voting. Social Choice and Welfare, 45 (1). 155–186. ISSN 0176-1714

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Abstract

We consider three mechanisms for the aggregation of information in heterogeneous committees voting by Unanimity rule: Private Voting and voting preceded by either Plenary or Subgroup Deliberation. While the first deliberation protocol imposes public communication, the second restricts communication to homogeneous subgroups. We find that both protocols allow to Pareto improve on outcomes achieved under private voting. Furthermore, we find that when focusing on simple equilibria under Plenary Deliberation, Subgroup Deliberation Pareto improves on outcomes achieved under Plenary Deliberation.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Industrial Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	12 Apr 2017 05:10
Last Modified:	13 May 2023 00:05
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/63225
DOI:	10.1007/s00355-015-0871-x

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