Consistency and communication in committees

Deimen, Inga, Ketelaar, Felix and Le Quement, Mark T. (2015) Consistency and communication in committees. Journal of Economic Theory, 160. pp. 24-35. ISSN 0022-0531

[img]
Preview
PDF (Accepted manuscript) - Submitted Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.

Download (352kB) | Preview

Abstract

We generalize the classical binary Condorcet jury model by introducing a richer state and signal space, thereby generating a concern for consistency in the evaluation of aggregate information. We analyze truth-telling incentives in simultaneous pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees and find that full pooling of information followed by sincere voting is compatible with a positive probability of ex post conflict in the committee.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: committees,voting,information aggregation,cheap talk
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 12 Apr 2017 05:10
Last Modified: 17 Mar 2020 23:15
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/63224
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.004

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item