Consistency and communication in committees

Deimen, Inga, Ketelaar, Felix and Le Quement, Mark T. (2015) Consistency and communication in committees. Journal of Economic Theory, 160. pp. 24-35. ISSN 0022-0531

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Abstract

We generalize the classical binary Condorcet jury model by introducing a richer state and signal space, thereby generating a concern for consistency in the evaluation of aggregate information. We analyze truth-telling incentives in simultaneous pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees and find that full pooling of information followed by sincere voting is compatible with a positive probability of ex post conflict in the committee.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	committees,voting,information aggregation,cheap talk
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Industrial Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	12 Apr 2017 05:10
Last Modified:	13 May 2023 00:05
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/63224
DOI:	10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.004

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