Inducing stability in hedonic games

Dimitrov, Dinko, Lazarova, Emiliya A. and Sung, Shao-Chin (2016) Inducing stability in hedonic games.

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Abstract

In many applications of coalition formation games, a key issue is that some desirable coalition structures are not elements of the core of these games. In these cases, it would be useful for an authority which aims to implement a certain outcome to know how far from the original game is the nearest game where the desirable outcome is part of the core. This question is at the center of this study. Focusing on hedonic games, we uncover previously unexplored links between such games and transferrable utility games, and develop a tailor-made solution concept for the transferrable utility game, the implementation core, to provide an answer to our question.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: hedonic game,implementation core,kemeny distance,stability
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 31 Oct 2016 17:00
Last Modified: 20 May 2020 00:19
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/61190
DOI:

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