On David Gauthier’s Theories of Coordination and Cooperation

Sugden, Robert (2016) On David Gauthier’s Theories of Coordination and Cooperation. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 55 (4). pp. 713-737.

[thumbnail of Accepted manuscript]
PDF (Accepted manuscript) - Accepted Version
Download (418kB) | Preview


In 1975, Gauthier discussed Schelling’s pure coordination games and Hodgson’s Hi-Lo game. While developing an original analysis of how rational players coordinate on ‘focal points,’ Gauthier argued, contrary to Schelling and Hodgson, that successful coordination in these games does not depend on deviations from conventional principles of individually rational choice. I argue that Gauthier’s analysis of constrained maximization in Morals by Agreement, which famously deviates from conventional game theory, has significant similarities with Schelling’s and Hodgson’s analyses of coordination. Constrained maximization can be thought of as a pragmatic and contractarian variant of the team-reasoning approach pioneered by Hodgson.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Previously reported as accepted by 'Rationality, Markets and Morals'. Following a reorganisation of that journal, the symposium in which this paper is included was transferred to 'Dialogue'.
Uncontrolled Keywords: gauthier,coordination,cooperation,focal points,salience
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 22 Mar 2016 09:09
Last Modified: 21 Oct 2022 01:14
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/57642
DOI: 10.1017/S0012217316000494

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item