On David Gauthier’s Theories of Coordination and Cooperation

Sugden, Robert (2016) On David Gauthier’s Theories of Coordination and Cooperation. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 55 (4). pp. 713-737.

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Abstract

In 1975, Gauthier discussed Schelling’s pure coordination games and Hodgson’s Hi-Lo game. While developing an original analysis of how rational players coordinate on ‘focal points,’ Gauthier argued, contrary to Schelling and Hodgson, that successful coordination in these games does not depend on deviations from conventional principles of individually rational choice. I argue that Gauthier’s analysis of constrained maximization in Morals by Agreement, which famously deviates from conventional game theory, has significant similarities with Schelling’s and Hodgson’s analyses of coordination. Constrained maximization can be thought of as a pragmatic and contractarian variant of the team-reasoning approach pioneered by Hodgson.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	Previously reported as accepted by 'Rationality, Markets and Morals'. Following a reorganisation of that journal, the symposium in which this paper is included was transferred to 'Dialogue'.
Uncontrolled Keywords:	gauthier,coordination,cooperation,focal points,salience
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	22 Mar 2016 09:09
Last Modified:	19 Apr 2023 00:51
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/57642
DOI:	10.1017/S0012217316000494

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