Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case

Rentschler, Lucas and Turocy, Theodore L. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2265-844X (2016) Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case. Journal of Economic Theory, 163. pp. 435-466. ISSN 0022-0531

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Abstract

We analyze symmetric, two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations and discrete type spaces. Relaxing previous restrictions on the distribution of types and the valuation structure, we present a construction that characterizes all symmetric equilibria. We show how the search problem this construction faces can be complex. In equilibrium, randomization can take place over disjoint intervals of bids, equilibrium supports can have a rich structure, and non-monotonicity of the equilibrium may result in a positive probability of allocative inefficiency when the value of the prize is not common. Particular attention is paid to the case in which an increase in a bidder’s posterior expected value of winning the auction is likely to be accompanied by a corresponding increase for the other bidder. Such environments are “highly competitive” in the sense that the bidder’s higher valuation also signals that the other bidder has an incentive to bid aggressively.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	contests,all-pay auctions,mixed strategies
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Experimental Economics (former - to 2017) Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	18 Mar 2016 10:00
Last Modified:	14 Jun 2023 12:27
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/57576
DOI:	10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.005

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