Cracking down on bribery

Banuri, Sheheryar ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8021-0299 and Eckel, Catherine (2015) Cracking down on bribery. Social Choice and Welfare, 45. pp. 579-600. ISSN 0176-1714

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Abstract

Do crackdowns on bribery impact corrupt behavior in the long run? In this paper we observe the long-run impact of a short-term punishment institution (i.e., a crackdown) on bribery behavior in a lab setting. We conduct lab experiments in two countries with cultures that differ in corruption norms, and which experience very different levels of bribery: the US and Pakistan. Bribery is implemented in the laboratory as a repeated three-player sequential game, consisting of a firm, a government official and a citizen. The design contains three phases: pre-crackdown, crackdown, and post-crackdown. Results show that post-crackdown behavior is not significantly different from pre-crackdown behavior in either country. We conclude that short-term crackdowns may impact behavior in the short run, depending on the strength of the existing corruption norms in the country. More importantly, in our setting crackdowns are completely ineffective in the long run, as corrupt behavior rebounds to pre-crackdown levels.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	bribery,corruption,experiments,punishment,culture,sdg 16 - peace, justice and strong institutions ,/dk/atira/pure/sustainabledevelopmentgoals/peace_justice_and_strong_institutions
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural and Experimental Development Economics
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	01 Dec 2015 07:26
Last Modified:	19 Dec 2024 00:48
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/55531
DOI:	10.1007/s00355-015-0883-6

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