Bargaining under Surveillance: Evidence from a Three-Person Ultimatum Game

Saaksvuori, Lauri and Ramalingam, Abhijit (2015) Bargaining under Surveillance: Evidence from a Three-Person Ultimatum Game. Journal of Economic Psychology, 51. pp. 66-78. ISSN 0167-4870

[img]
Preview
PDF (AcceptedManuscript) - Submitted Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.

Download (748kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper investigates how the transparency of decision-making affects preferences over distributional outcomes. We also examine what motivates individuals to voluntarily invest economic resources to monitor decision-making processes. We find that third-party monitoring does not affect distributional outcomes in a three-person ultimatum game. Our results show that a large majority of individuals is willing to pay for a right to monitor decision-making processes despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. We observe that third-parties are over-confident in believing that an opportunity to scrutinize decision-making processes changes distributional outcomes for their own benefit. Our results suggest that people may over-estimate the effect of transparent decision-making on economic outcomes.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: bargaining, communication,distributional preferences,experiment,negotiations,surveillance
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 21 Oct 2015 15:00
Last Modified: 09 Sep 2020 23:41
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/54740
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2015.08.007

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item