Bargaining under surveillance: Evidence from a three-person ultimatum game

Saaksvuori, Lauri and Ramalingam, Abhijit (2015) Bargaining under surveillance: Evidence from a three-person ultimatum game. Journal of Economic Psychology, 51. pp. 66-78. ISSN 0167-4870

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Abstract

This paper investigates how the transparency of decision-making affects preferences over distributional outcomes. We also examine what motivates individuals to voluntarily invest economic resources to monitor decision-making processes. We find that third-party monitoring does not affect distributional outcomes in a three-person ultimatum game. Our results show that a large majority of individuals is willing to pay for a right to monitor decision-making processes despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. We observe that third-parties are over-confident in believing that an opportunity to scrutinize decision-making processes changes distributional outcomes for their own benefit. Our results suggest that people may over-estimate the effect of transparent decision-making on economic outcomes.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	bargaining, communication,distributional preferences,experiment,negotiations,surveillance
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	21 Oct 2015 15:00
Last Modified:	21 Oct 2022 01:11
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/54740
DOI:	10.1016/j.joep.2015.08.007

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