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Brunnschweiler, Christa 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8610-6433
(2014)
A study of expressive choice and strikes.
European Journal of Political Economy, 34.
111–125.
ISSN 1873-5703
Abstract
The conventional explanation for strikes is that they are caused by an asymmetry of information about the profitability of the firm — union members are uninformed whereas management are informed. Instead, this paper builds a model of strikes where a perception of unfairness provides an expressive benefit to vote for a strike. The asymmetry of information is now reversed such that management are uninformed about the emotionality of union members. The model predicts that larger union size increases both wage offers and the incidence of strikes. An empirical test using UK data provides support for the predictions. In particular, union size is positively correlated with the incidence of strikes and other industrial actions, even when asymmetric information regarding profitability is controlled for.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | expressive choice,survey analysis, fairness,strikes |
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Applied Econometrics And Finance Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural and Experimental Development Economics University of East Anglia Schools > Faculty of Science > Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Faculty of Science > Research Centres > Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research |
| Depositing User: | Pure Connector |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Mar 2015 16:19 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Jul 2023 14:30 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/52590 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.01.004 |
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