Dynamic multilateral markets

Polanski, Arnold and Lazarova, Emiliya (2015) Dynamic multilateral markets. International Journal of Game Theory, 44 (4). pp. 815-833. ISSN 1432-1270

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Abstract

We study dynamic multilateral markets, in which players' payoffs result from intra-coalitional bargaining. The latter is modeled as the ultimatum game with exogenous (time-invariant) recognition probabilities and unanimity acceptance rule. Players in agreeing coalitions leave the market and are replaced by their replicas, which keeps the pool of market participants constant over time. In this infinite game, we establish payoff uniqueness of stationary equilibria and the emergence of endogenous cooperation structures when traders experience some degree of (heterogeneous) bargaining frictions. When we focus on market games with different player types, we derive, under mild conditions, an explicit formula for each type's equilibrium payoff as the market frictions vanish.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: multilateral bargaining,dynamic markets,partitioning equilibrium,labor markets
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 27 Nov 2014 17:52
Last Modified: 22 Jul 2020 00:01
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/50504
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-014-0455-5

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