Balanced weights and three-sided coalition formation

Lazarova, E. ORCID: and Dimitrov, D. (2010) Balanced weights and three-sided coalition formation. Games, 1 (2). pp. 159-167. ISSN 2073-4336

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We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Applied Econometrics And Finance
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Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 06 Mar 2014 12:26
Last Modified: 24 Oct 2022 06:10
DOI: 10.3390/g1020159


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