Mergers after cartels: How markets react to cartel breakdown

Davies, Stephen, Ormosi, Peter ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6472-6511 and Graffenberger, Martin (2014) Mergers after cartels: How markets react to cartel breakdown. Working Paper. Centre for Competition Policy.

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Abstract

This paper examines whether cartel breakdown provokes a period of intensive merger activity amongst the former cartelists, designed to re-establish tacit collusion. Using a novel application of recurrent event survival analysis for a pooled sample of 84 European cartels, it finds that mergers are indeed more frequent post-cartel breakdown, especially in markets which are less concentrated. However, it cautions against merely assuming that these mergers are motivated by coordinated effects - alternatively, they may be the consequence of market restructuring, necessitated by more intense competition post-cartel. Further disaggregated analysis of the individual mergers show that on average these mergers are profitable for the acquiring company, and that the tacit collusion motive is likely to be at work for a large minority of the mergers.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Norwich Business School
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Industrial Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Responsible Business Regulation Group
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	06 Mar 2014 12:28
Last Modified:	26 Oct 2024 00:03
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/47814
DOI:	isbn:ISSN 1745-9648

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