Rules for choosing among public goods:A contractarian approach

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Sugden, R. (1990) Rules for choosing among public goods:A contractarian approach. Constitutional Political Economy, 1 (2). pp. 63-82. ISSN 1043-4062

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Abstract

This paper asks what rules for supplying and financing public goods would be chosen by individuals at the constitutional level. A new principle of decision-making is proposed. This separates decisions about how much to spend on public goods from decisions about how to allocate this spending among different public goods; the latter decision is made by allowing each individual to determine how his own tax payment will be spent. Analogies are drawn between this principle and proportional representation, tax relief for charities, and certain procedures for providing state support for political parties and churches.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Related URLs:	http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?...
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	19 Nov 2013 16:15
Last Modified:	18 Apr 2023 23:43
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/44512
DOI:	10.1007/BF02393042

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