Why rationality is not a consequence of Hume's theory of choice

Sugden, R. (2005) Why rationality is not a consequence of Hume's theory of choice. European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 12 (1). pp. 113-118. ISSN 0967-2567

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Abstract

This paper argues that the theory of action proposed by Hume in the Treatise does not imply that individuals are rational in the sense of modern choice theory. An individual's behaviour is non-rational if his/her choices systematically contravene the consistency axioms of the theory, and if the causal explanation of those choices cannot credibly be offered as a reason for making them. Hume proposes a theory of causal relationships between mental states, based on associations of ideas. The relationships he postulates are liable to induce various forms of non-rational behaviour, some of which have since been observed in controlled experiments.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	hume,choice theory,rationality
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Related URLs:	http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?...
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	19 Nov 2013 16:14
Last Modified:	18 Apr 2023 23:43
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/44510
DOI:	10.1080/0967256042000338069

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